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At the most general level, manipulation is one of many ways of influencing behavior, 
along with (but to be distinguished from) other ways, such as coercion and rational 
persuasion. Like these other ways of influencing behavior, manipulation is of crucial 
importance in various ethical contexts. First, there are important questions 
 concerning the moral status of manipulation itself; manipulation seems to be mor-
ally problematic in ways in which (say) rational persuasion does not. Why is this so? 
Furthermore, the notion of manipulation has played an increasingly central role in 
debates about free will and moral responsibility. Despite its significance in these 
(and other) contexts, however, the notion of manipulation itself remains deeply 
vexed. I would say notoriously vexed, but in fact direct philosophical treatments of 
the notion of manipulation are few and far between, and those that do exist are nota-
ble for the sometimes widely divergent conclusions they reach concerning what it is. 
I begin by addressing (though certainly not resolving) the conceptual issue of how to 
distinguish manipulation from other ways of influencing behavior. Along the way, 
I  also briefly address the (intimately related) question of the moral status of 
 manipulation: what, if anything, makes it morally problematic? Then I discuss the 
 controversial ways in which the notion of manipulation has been employed in 
 contemporary debates about free will and moral responsibility.
What is Manipulation? What is its Moral Status?
We can start characterizing manipulation by contrasting it with coercion (see 
coercion), on the one hand, and rational persuasion on the other. Suppose Cody 
issues the familiar threat to Valerie: your money or your life. Here we have a case of 
(attempted) coercion. Consider instead a case in which Rick, a charity worker, tries to 
elicit a donation from Valerie by pointing out (what he takes to be) the moral reasons 
she has to aid those in need. Here we have a case of (attempted) rational persuasion. 
Both Cody and Rick are trying to influence Valerie’s behavior – both are trying to get 
her to hand over some money – but neither is attempting to manipulate her. Why not? 
One natural thought here would be the following. Both such ways of influencing Valerie 
are in some sense “overt”; in both cases, Valerie is fully aware of the ways in which Cody 
and Rick are trying to influence her. But manipulation is instead “covert” rather than 
“overt.” That is, manipulation essentially involves deception; those who allege that they 
were manipulated claim that there were hidden factors at least partially responsible for 
their actions. As a first approximation, then, one might think to distinguish manipulation 
from coercion and rational persuasion as follows: to attempt to manipulate someone is 
to attempt to influence his or her behavior by means of deception.
2Yet we’ll want to be careful how we appeal to deception here. In particular, not all 
cases of influencing behavior by means of deception would seem to be cases of 
manipulation. Consider a case (slightly modified) from Rudinow, in which “a man 
stands at a fork in the road and knowingly directs to Minsk people who ask the way to 
Pinsk,” perhaps because he gets a dollar for every car that ends up in Minsk (Rudinow 
1978: 343). Intuitively, this does not rise to the level of manipulation. Why not? 
According to Rudinow, because the man is simply trying to influence the travelers’ 
behavior in ways that take advantage of – rather than modify – their previously 
established goals, viz., getting to Pinsk. However, says Rudinow, if one tries to motivate 
someone’s behavior by trying to change her goals (or by getting her to adopt new 
ones), and one does this by means of deception, then one is engaged in manipulation. 
But such a suggestion also faces problems. Suppose the man instead tells those who 
are on the way to Pinsk that a horrible accident has closed the road to Pinsk and so 
they had better go to Minsk instead. Here the man seemingly has changed their goals 
by means of deception, yet on finding out the truth, such travelers are likely to report 
feeling duped, but probably not manipulated. I suspect we are reluctant (if we are) to 
call such cases instances of manipulation at least in part because the given influence 
on behavior is not predicated on any special knowledge of the target’s situation or 
psychology, but instead on the quite general fact that we are inclined to trust the 
testimony of others when there does not appear to be reason not to. In short, these 
tactics are not “sophisticated” enough to count as manipulation, and one task for an 
account of manipulation would be to explain the sort of sophistication at issue.
Consider instead another (or additional) way one might try to distinguish 
manipulation from coercion and rational persuasion. Instead of focusing on the 
ways in which manipulation is (allegedly) “covert,” we might instead focus on 
the capacities of the targets of relevant kinds of influence – in particular, their 
capacities for rational reflection and deliberation. In cases of attempted coercion 
and rational persuasion, one does not try to bypass these capacities, but instead one 
tries to influence the target in ways that go through them (see moral agency). (In 
cases of coercion, of course, one “goes through” such capacities only in the sense that 
one tries to overwhelm them; one tries to present one’s target with considerations she 
will regard as irresistibly compelling compliance with one’s demands.) One 
promising conception of manipulation is that it instead seeks to influence behavior 
in ways that (in some sense) bypass the target’s capacities for rational reflection 
altogether. (For discussion of a similar notion of “bypassing,” see Mele 1995.) One 
challenge for such an account would be to avoid construing manipulation so widely 
that various benign ways of trying to influence behavior turn out to be manipulative. 
Consider the wearing of perfume or cologne. If Jones wears cologne on a date, then 
he is likely trying to influence his date’s behavior, but likely not by prompting her to 
rationally reflect on his choice to wear cologne. Rather, he is likely trying – perhaps 
pathetically  – to get his date to simply feel attraction toward him, without ever 
having rationally reflected about why this would (or should) be so. Yet I think many 
will be reluctant to say that those (like Jones) who (say) try to appear attractive 
before going on dates are attempting to manipulate their dates.
3Why is this so? Again, I suspect that we are reluctant (if we are) to call this sort of 
behavior attempted manipulation at least partially because such actions are again 
typically not predicated on any special knowledge of the target’s situation or psy-
chology. (Similar remarks could apply to various sorts of advertising and marketing; 
typically, marketers target certain groups generally, and are only able to exploit their 
knowledge concerning general facts about human psychology. This may explain why 
one might think that while various forms of advertising and marketing are morally 
problematic, they typically do not rise to the level of manipulation.) On the other 
hand, we may be reluctant to regard the wearing of cologne as attempted manipula-
tion because, typically, engaging in such “tactics” is in accord with the commonly 
known and accepted “rules” governing such interpersonal interactions; when one 
agrees to go on a “date” one generally understands that one is entering into a social 
context in which such tactics may be employed. Thus, if one is swayed by such 
 tactics, one cannot complain of having been manipulated by them, since one knew 
(or should have known) that they would probably be employed, and thus one should 
have taken precautions against them.
One operative assumption of the preceding discussion is that an adequate 
account of manipulation should not include ways of influencing behavior that we 
rightly regard to be morally unproblematic. Plausibly, so the thought would go, 
manipulation is at least prima facie wrong in the following sense: if one is attempt-
ing to manipulate someone else, then one’s actions are permissible only if one has 
an excuse or a justification for doing so. One doesn’t need an excuse or a justifica-
tion for walking around the block, or, plausibly, for wearing cologne on a date, but 
it strongly seems that one does need an excuse for attempting to manipulate 
someone, the standard worry being that manipulation somehow violates or 
undermines autonomy (see autonomy). Of course, some may deny that manipu-
lation must even be prima facie wrong in this sense. Some, however, might argue 
that manipulation is not only always prima facie wrong, but always also ultima 
facie wrong – that is, that there can be no excuse or justification for it. Presumably, 
those theorists most likely to be attracted to this thesis will be those attracted to 
the (notoriously difficult)  Kantian thesis that it is always and everywhere wrong 
to treat others as merely means to an end, together with the claim that manipula-
tion always involves treating others in precisely this way (see kant, immanuel; 
categorical imperative). Notably, those taking this line would (minimally) 
have to explain why Jones’ wearing of cologne is not manipulative, or they would 
have to explain how it is that in doing so he problematically treats his date “as a 
mere means.”
Another issue worth discussing concerning the concept of manipulation – and 
one that will help us transition to the next section – concerns the relationship 
between manipulation per se and acting manipulatively or being manipulative. 
Arguably, those (few) who have been interested in the conceptual issues surround-
ing manipulation have only been after an account of what it is to act manipulatively 
(Rudinow 1978; Greenspan 1993; Noggle 1996). That is, in seemingly all of the cases 
of (putative) manipulation discussed in this literature, it seems appropriate to say 
4that the manipulator is acting manipulatively or being manipulative, where this 
involves the manifestation of the characteristic vice of having a manipulative 
 personality. We might call any case of  manipulation in which it is appropriate to say 
that the manipulator is being manipulative a case of interpersonal manipulation. 
However, there are plausibly cases of manipulation in which it would not be appro-
priate to say that the given manipulators are being manipulative or acting manipula-
tively, cases that (understandably) have not occupied the attention of those whose 
interests in manipulation stem from the ethics of interpersonal relationships. Of 
course, it can seem simply analytic – true simply in virtue of the meanings of terms 
– that any case of manipulation must also be a case of someone acting manipula-
tively or being manipulative, but this is a thesis we should (arguably) resist.
Consider, for instance, cases familiar to philosophers who work on the problems 
of free will (see free will) and moral responsibility (see responsibility), cases in 
which, say, some very powerful neuroscientists have covertly implanted a chip in 
Jones’ brain that allows them to influence his behavior via remote control. Suppose 
the chip works by directly inducing various desires in Jones, or suppose it works by 
triggering the right release of chemicals in Jones’ brain that will be sufficient for 
Jones’ coming to have a given belief or desire (or …), and suppose the neuroscien-
tists are doing this as part of some experiment in behavioral control. Now, it seems 
clear that these neuroscientists are manipulating Jones by means of the chip. 
However, it doesn’t seem clearly right to say that they are being manipulative or act-
ing manipulatively, anyway not in anything like the pejorative (“That manipulative 
jerk!”) sense in which these terms are typically used. In particular, while they very 
plausibly have some vices, we needn’t suppose at all that these neuroscientists exhibit 
manipulative personalities when engaged in interpersonal relationships with, say, 
friends or loved ones. The neuroscientists are here manipulating Jones in the sense 
in which an engineer might manipulate the controls on a machine, and it would 
clearly be odd to say of such an engineer that she is, on this account, “so manipula-
tive.” This is because the engineer is not engaged in any sort of interpersonal 
 relationship with what she manipulates. And neither are the neuroscientists engaged 
in any such relationship with Jones (however different he may be from a machine). 
The upshot here is this. When we’re theorizing about manipulation, we ought to take 
care to distinguish manipulation per se and cases in which agents are acting 
 manipulatively or being manipulative.
A final word is in order here concerning the concept of manipulation. After 
 considering the issues of this section, one might naturally think that there is no such 
single thing that deserves to be called “manipulation,” and that there simply are no 
informative necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s being a case of 
manipulation. Rather, the concept of manipulation is best thought of as a “family 
resemblance” concept. On this view, various things might deserve to be called 
“manipulation,” and while there will be resemblances between all such cases, there 
will not be some one core unifying (and informative) property they all have in com-
mon. Given the widely divergent contexts in which the notion of manipulation 
seems appropriately used, this view can seem particularly plausible.
5Manipulation, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility
Perhaps the easiest way to begin to see how the notion of manipulation has figured 
into debates about free will and moral responsibility is to note the ways in which it 
has caused problems for one account of the conditions under which agents are free 
and responsible. (For simplicity, I will not distinguish here between the conditions 
for free will and moral responsibility, if these conditions differ.) Consider the sort of 
“mesh” view defended by Harry Frankfurt (1971; Fischer 1994: 208–9). On this view, 
it is sufficient for acting freely and responsibly that (roughly) one acts from desires 
that exhibit the right “mesh” with one’s higher-order desires. For instance, suppose 
that not only does Jones want to rob the store (a first-order desire), but also he 
wants to want to rob the store (a second-order desire) – he endorses being the sort of 
person who wants to rob stores, so that robbing stores expresses (in some sense) 
“where he stands.” Then, if his desire to rob the store culminates in his doing so, he 
did so freely and responsibly. The crucial idea here is that it is enough for freedom 
and responsibility that we act from the “wills we want to have.”
But suppose Jones is the same Jones considered above, who is subject to the  control 
of the neuroscientists. Suppose they directly induce in Jones the desire to rob the store. 
But they also want to bring it about that Jones freely and responsibly robs the store, so, 
heeding Frankfurt, they similarly bring it about that Jones wants to want to rob the 
store. In such a scenario, Frankfurt would be committed to saying that Jones robs the 
store freely and responsibly (and thus perhaps deserves blame or even  punishment), 
but this can seem like the wrong result (see blame; desert;  punishment). The prob-
lem is that I could be acting from a will I want to have, but it could nevertheless be that 
I was manipulated into wanting to have that will. In other words, we shouldn’t pay 
attention only to features of the agent at the time of action, e.g., whether her action was 
in accord with her second-order desires, and so on. Manipulation scenarios ( arguably) 
show that we should also pay attention to how the agent got to be that way in the first 
place; perhaps she came to be that way via responsibility-undermining manipulation. 
In short, cases involving manipulation seem to be counterexamples to Frankfurt’s 
account of free will and moral responsibility.
So cases involving manipulation have posed problems for some accounts of 
free will and moral responsibility. Some philosophers, however, have gone on to 
argue that similar cases in fact undermine a whole class of such theories – 
namely, compatibilist theories on which free will and moral responsibility are 
compatible with determinism (Kane 1996; Pereboom 2001). The doctrine of 
determinism can be hard to understand, and how it should be defined is contro-
versial. Roughly, however, determinism is the thesis that past states of the world, 
together with the laws of nature, entail a unique future. More concretely, if 
determinism is true, then all of our behavior is (in some sense) “fixed” by such 
factors as our genes, upbringing, and environment. In principle, then, if some-
one knew enough about the laws of nature, and knew enough about our pasts, 
then she could predict with perfect accuracy everything that we ever do. And 
compatibilism is the thesis that free will and moral responsibility are compatible 
6with determinism, so understood. Now, at least one way of putting the challenge 
for compatibilism is as follows. If determinism is true, then there are law-like 
connections between certain prior states of the world and certain human actions. 
Thus, it seems, we could imagine certain powerful manipulators who know 
about these sorts of law-like connections, and are thus able to guarantee in 
advance everything we do. But it can seem that anyone that has been manipu-
lated or controlled in this sort of way could be neither free nor responsible. 
Compatibilists, however, seem committed to the claim that some such agents 
could indeed be free or responsible, depending on the details of how these agents 
were deterministically “set up” to perform the relevant actions. And some take 
this to be a cost for compatibilism.
Of course, the compatibilist will again insist that it all depends on the details. If 
the manipulation unfolds in some ways, then the compatibilist could plausibly 
insist that the relevant agent does not in fact meet plausible compatibilist condi-
tions for responsibility. Thus, according to the compatibilist, there would be some 
freedom and/or responsibility relevant difference between an agent manipulated in 
this sort of way, and otherwise “normal” agents in a deterministic world. This would 
be to take a “soft-line” reply to the given case (McKenna 2008). To take a “hard-line” 
reply to the case, on the other hand, would be to admit that the given agent is 
indeed free and responsible, despite having been “set up” in the relevant way, but to 
contend that this is not an ultimately unacceptable result. Notably, however, the 
compatibilist is seemingly committed to taking a “hard-line” reply to at least some 
suitably formulated manipulation scenario, unless she contends that the fact that 
one’s actions deterministically “trace back” to an intentional cause in itself rules out 
freedom and responsibility. One challenge for such a view – and an important issue 
more generally about the notion of manipulation – would be to explain what rele-
vant difference there might be between the causes of one’s actions being put in place 
by intentional agents, and (otherwise similar) causes having been there as a matter 
of brute natural chance. Of course, only agents can (strictly speaking) manipulate 
us, but couldn’t nature itself be the functional equivalent of a manipulator?
In sum, manipulation scenarios have primarily been employed in order to chal-
lenge various compatibilist accounts of free will and responsibility. But work on 
these topics is certainly far from complete.
See also: autonomy; blame; categorical imperative; coercion; desert; 
free will; kant, immanuel; moral agency; punishment; responsibility
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